

She is to become a goddess, and one manifestation of her divinity will be the weightiness of her now immortal body.²

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² My thanks to Jasper Griffin for drawing my attention to both ancient evidence and modern bibliography.

PLATO, *TIMAEUS* 52c2–5*

In a long and important sentence in the *Timaeus* (52b6–d1), Plato explains that, whereas that which truly or really is (τῷ δὲ ὄντως ὄντι) cannot come to be in anything else, sensible things, being mere images, must necessarily come to be *in* something else, on pain of not existing at all:

ὥς εἰκόني μὲν, ἐπεὶ περ οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐφ' ᾧ γέγονεν ἑαυτῆς ἔστιν, ἑτέρου δέ τινος ἀεὶ φέρεται φάντασμα, διὰ ταῦτα ἐν ἑτέρῳ προσήκει τινὶ γίγνεσθαι, οὐσίας ἀμωσγέπως ἀντεχομένην, ἢ μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν αὐτὴν εἶναι (52c2–5).¹

The syntax and sense of the clause οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐφ' ᾧ γέγονεν ἑαυτῆς ἔστιν have been much disputed. In 1956 Harold Cherniss offered a thorough review and critique of previous translations and interpretations.² He convincingly rejects, on grounds of sense and grammar, interpretations that give ἐφ' ᾧ a straightforward local (that 'in which' an image is or has come to be) or final sense (that 'for the sake of which' an image is or has come to be). He rejects as well those that take ἐφ' ᾧ γέγονεν to designate that 'on which' or 'after which' an image has been made or modelled or that 'which it was made to' represent.³ Included herein are all interpretations that make the clause say that an image is not its own original or model or, alternatively, its own image. A rather different interpretation was proposed by Cornford,⁴ who supposed that ἐφ' ᾧ expresses the conditions or terms on which an image comes to be (for ἐπί with the dative in this sense cf. e.g. *Lg.* 874b7 with England's note). The 'conditions' of an image's coming to be are the existence of (1) an original for it to be modelled upon and (2) a medium to contain it, and Cherniss cogently objects that if Cornford's interpretation were right, the words ἑτέρου δέ τινος ἀεὶ φέρεται φάντασμα, which express condition (1), should be parallel with ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινὶ γίγνεσθαι, which express condition (2), and therefore (like them) in the infinitive construction of indirect discourse (rather than in the ἐπεὶ περ-clause).⁵

Cherniss himself explains the clause in terms of the idiom Plato uses to designate that which a word refers to.⁶ Cf. e.g. *Prt.* 349b1–3: σοφία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία

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¹ References to dialogues of the first and second tetralogies follow the new OCT of E. A. Duke *et al.*, *Platonis Opera* i (Oxford, 1995); all other dialogues are cited from the edition of Burnet.

² H. Cherniss, 'Timaeus 52 C 2–5', in *Mélanges de philosophie grecque offerts à Mgr. Diès* (Paris, 1956), pp. 49–60, reprinted in his *Selected Papers* (Leiden, 1977), pp. 364–75, hereafter referred to as 'Cherniss'.

³ Cf. Cherniss 50–7 = 365–72.

⁴ F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (London, 1937), pp. 192 n. 4, 370–1.

⁵ Cf. Cherniss 54–5 = 369–70.

⁶ Cf. Cherniss 58–9 = 373–4.

καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης, πότερον ταῦτα, πέντε ὄντα ὀνόματα, ἐπὶ ἐνὶ πράγματι ἐστίν᾽ ('do wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, and holiness, five names, refer to one thing?'). Here, as in *Cra.* 433e7–8, 434c7–8, 437c3–4, *Prm.* 147d1–2, 9, e1–2, 4–6, 164b9–c1, *Sph.* 218c2–3, 237d1–2, 244c1–2, and 262a3–7 (all cited by Cherniss), ἐπὶ with the dative designates that which a word refers to, stands for, or signifies. So also in *Sph.* 240a7–b1, after Theaetetus has defined an image as 'another of such sort likened to the real thing' (τὸ πρὸς τᾷληθινὸν ἀφωμοιωμένον ἕτερον τοιοῦτον), the Eleatic stranger asks whether by 'another of such sort' Theaetetus means another real thing, or to what did he use the word 'of such sort' to refer? (ἢ ἐπὶ τίνι τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶπεσθαι).⁷ Similarly, in *Ti.* 52c2 ἐφ' ᾧ γέγονεν designates that which an image has come⁸ to signify or refer to, what it stands for. As Cherniss points out, it is entirely appropriate that the language applied elsewhere to the relation of words and their significates should be applied here to images, since for Plato words are but one example of images—namely images of the things that they signify.⁹ Cherniss, then, translates the clause: 'since not even that very thing that an image signifies belongs to the image itself'.

Subsequent translators and commentators either follow Cherniss or simply ignore the difficulties the clause presents. Brisson, Lee, and Gill, for instance, express agreement with Cherniss's construction and interpretation of the disputed clause (though not necessarily with all details of his understanding of the passage as a whole).¹⁰ Patterson¹¹ reverts to the interpretation defended by Cook Wilson, Wilamowitz, Taylor, and others,¹² translating: 'since even that which it [sc. an image] is supposed to be does not belong to it'. But he fails to confront the formidable objections to this interpretation raised by both Cornford and Cherniss.¹³ Prior¹⁴ translates 'since not even that itself in dependence on which it [sc. an image] has come to be belongs to it', and in support of such an interpretation of ἐφ' ᾧ refers to LSJ, s.v. ἐπὶ B I.1g. A mere glance at this portion of LSJ's entry reveals that Prior has completely misunderstood the usage he invokes, which denotes that an action is 'in someone's power'. Interpreted as Prior suggests, the clause in question would mean 'that in whose power an image is', which is obviously nonsense. Most recently Zekl¹⁵ translates: 'auch das, nach dem es [sc. ein Bild] gebildet ist, nicht aus ihm selbst kommt'. This not only gives a peculiar sense to ἐαυτῆς ἐστίν, it ignores the crucial fact

⁷ Cf. further LSJ, s.v. 'ἐπὶ' B III.5 with the passages there cited, as well as Aristotle, *A.Pr.* 31b4–5 (ἔστω γὰρ τὸ μὲν A ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ἐφ' ᾧ B ζῶον, τὸ δὲ Γ ἵππος) with the comment of T. Waitz, *Aristotelis organon graece* i (Leipzig, 1844), p. 398: 'τὸ δ' ἐφ' ᾧ B non idem est quod τὸ δὲ B: hoc enim terminum significat, illud rem ad quam terminus refertur etc.' (cited by Cherniss 58 n. 2 = 373 n. 2).

⁸ γέγονεν is used here instead of ἐστίν in order to emphasize the transitory nature of the image, which comes to signify what it signifies 'only at the moment of its appearance' (Cherniss 59 n. 7 = 374 n. 7).

⁹ Cf. Cherniss 58 with n. 4 = 373 with n. 4.

¹⁰ Cf. L. Brisson, *Le même et l'autre dans la structure ontologique du Timée de Platon* (Paris, 1974), p. 195 with n. 2 (who, however, translates ambiguously: 'puisque cela même par rapport à quoi elle vient à l'être ne lui appartient pas en propre'); E. N. Lee, *Monist* 50 (1966), 359 with n. 42; M. L. Gill, *Phronesis* 32 (1987), 49 with n. 31.

¹¹ R. Patterson, *Image and Reality in Plato's Metaphysics* (Indianapolis, 1985), pp. 44–6, 84–5.

¹² Cf. J. Cook Wilson, *On the Interpretation of Plato's Timaeus* (London, 1889), pp. 109–10; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Platon*³ ii (Dublin and Zurich, 1962), pp. 391–2; A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (Oxford, 1928), pp. 347–8.

¹³ Cf. Cornford (n. 4), 370 and Cherniss 53–4 = 368–9.

¹⁴ W. J. Prior, *Unity and Development in Plato's Metaphysics* (La Salle, 1985), p. 114 with n. 28.

¹⁵ H. G. Zekl, *Platon: Timaios* (Hamburg, 1992), p. 85.

(signalled by Cornford and Cherniss¹⁶) that no parallel has ever been cited in support of the sense here attributed to ἐφ' ᾧ.

Cherniss's interpretation of the precise sense of ἐφ' ᾧ γέγονεν is almost certainly correct, supported as it is by the many decisive parallels he has brought to light. Nevertheless, two points raise doubts about his construction of the clause οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐφ' ᾧ γέγονεν ἐαυτῆς ἐστιν as a whole. In the first place, in taking εἰκὼν as subject of γέγονεν and φέρεται, but αὐτὸ τοῦτο as subject of ἐστιν, Cherniss assumes a rather awkward, unannounced change of subject.¹⁷ Secondly, he is compelled to suppose that ἐαυτῆς,¹⁸ which he construes as a possessive genitive, refers not to the grammatical subject αὐτὸ τοῦτο but rather to εἰκὼν. Although Cherniss is able to cite parallels for the reflexive referring in this way to the 'thing most prominent in the speaker's thought',¹⁹ it is hard not to feel, with Wilamowitz and others, that ἐαυτῆς rather requires εἰκὼν as subject of ἐστιν.²⁰

Neither of these syntactical anomalies by itself proves anything; taken together, however, they suggest that something is amiss with Cherniss's construction of the clause. Both can be eliminated by the simple expedient of construing εἰκὼν as subject of ἐστιν, with αὐτὸ τοῦτο the predicate. This construction also has the advantage of giving to the obviously emphatic words αὐτὸ τοῦτο an appropriately emphatic position in the clause (inversion of subject and predicate). Most important, it is perfectly compatible with Cherniss's interpretation of the meaning of ἐφ' ᾧ γέγονεν: 'since an image is not the very thing that it signifies' or 'stands for'. As for the reflexive ἐαυτῆς, on the interpretation suggested here it can no longer be construed (with Cornford, Cherniss, and others) as a possessive genitive. Kühner²¹ long ago explained it rather as a genitive of 'relation', citing several supporting parallels from Plato. Cf. e.g. *R.* 597d13: 'Ἄλλ' τί αὐτὸν [sc. τὸν ζωγράφον] κλίνης φήσεις εἶναι; ('But what shall we say that he is in relation to a bed?'); *Smp.* 204d4: τί τῶν καλῶν ἐστιν ὁ Ἔρως; ('What is Eros in relation to beautiful things?'); and *Sph.* 255d6–7: ὅτι περ ἕτερον ἦ, συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέρου τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι ('Whatever is "other" must necessarily be what it is [sc. "other"] in relation to another'). It may be objected that this interpretation seems to render ἐαυτῆς superfluous; for, wishing to say that an image is not the very thing it signifies, Plato hardly needed to add 'in relation to itself'. And indeed it is superfluous, on the level of strict logic. I suggest, however, that the main function of ἐαυτῆς is to provide a foil and contrast to the words ἑτέρου δέ τινος which follow,²² and thereby to reinforce the point that, whatever

¹⁶ Cf. Cornford (n. 4), 370 and Cherniss 53 = 368.

¹⁷ For such unannounced changes of subject cf. Cherniss 59 n. 6 = 374 n. 6, with the reference to B. L. Gildersleeve, *Syntax of Classical Greek* i (New York, 1900), p. 36; Cornford (n. 4), 371; G. J. de Vries, *Mnemosyne* 12 (1959), 64; 18 (1965), 242–3.

¹⁸ Neither Burnet nor the Budé editor Rivaud records any variants. At Simplicius, in *Ph.* 539.28 (Diels), where the passage of *Ti.* is quoted, Diels reports that the MSS offer αὐτῆς, which Stephanus in fact proposed to read (cf. Cherniss 50 n. 3 = 365 n. 3). Yet Simplicius quotes the passage also at in *Ph.* 225.10 (Diels), where the MSS offer ἐαυτῆς. There is no good reason to suspect the text.

¹⁹ Cf. Cherniss 50 n. 3 = 365 n. 3; R. Kühner and B. Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache II: Satzlehre* i (Hannover and Leipzig, 1898), p. 562.

²⁰ Cf. Wilamowitz (n. 12), 392: 'Keine Erklärung, die das Reflexivum hält, darf εἰκὼν als Subjekt aufgeben'.

²¹ Cf. Kühner–Gerth (n. 19), i.334, Anm. 2.

²² Note the chiasmic arrangement in the ἐπείπερ-clause as a whole, which balances αὐτὸ τοῦτο with φάντασμα (both predicates of εἰκὼν), ἐαυτῆς with ἑτέρου τινος, and ἐστιν with φέρεται.

meaning an image has, it has this meaning 'not independently as its own but only in reference to something else' (Cherniss 59 = 374).

One final aspect of the construction of the clause deserves some clarification: the negative οὐδέ. Most interpreters, if they take notice of it at all, give it the climactic sense of 'not even'.²³ According to Cook Wilson and Cherniss,²⁴ it implies that the clause αὐτὸ τοῦτο κτλ. denies something that might have been expected to be true. But it is also possible to account for the negative along different lines. Denniston²⁵ discusses the use of οὐδέ in causal or explanatory clauses and sentences in which the logical relationship is inverted in such a way that a negative idea which is logically prior to another is presented instead as posterior to it. Cf. e.g. *Prm.* 137e6–138a1: Οὕτε ἄρα εὐθὺ οὔτε περιφερές ἐστιν [sc. τὸ ἐν], ἐπεὶπερ οὐδέ μέρη ἔχει (cited by Denniston). Here, οὐδέ represents the logically prior negative idea 'does not have parts' as posterior to the negative idea 'is neither straight nor circular'. That is, instead of saying 'since it does not have parts, it is neither straight nor circular, either', Plato says 'it is neither straight nor circular, since it does not have parts either'. Cf. also *Alc.* 1 132d1–3, likewise cited by Denniston: 'Εγὼ σοι φράσω, ὃ γε ὑποπτεύω λέγειν καὶ συμβουλευεῖν ἡμῖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα [sc. γνώθι σεαυτόν]. κινδυνεύει γὰρ οὐδέ πολλαχού εἶναι παράδειγμα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν μόνον. Here, too, the logically prior negative idea 'there is not much evidence' is represented as posterior to the negative idea 'I am not certain what the inscription means'. (The latter negative, moreover, is merely implicit in the sentence as positively formulated—ὑποπτεύω.) A similar process of inversion is, I suggest, at work in *Ti.* 52c2–5. Here, an image's coming to be *in* something else (ἐν ἐτέρῳ τινὶ γίγνεσθαι) is treated implicitly as a negative notion ('to come to be in something else, not in itself') which, logically speaking, is consequent upon its being (as the ἐπεὶπερ-clause says) an image *of* something else. Yet, by the idiom in question, οὐδέ represents the ἐπεὶπερ-clause instead as logically posterior ('since an image is not, either, the very thing which it refers to etc.').

Ti. 52c2–5, then, means: 'that for an image, since it is not, in relation to itself, that very thing with reference to which it has come to be (i.e. that it signifies), but is an ever-moving apparition²⁶ of something else, it is proper (not) to come to be (in itself, either, but) in something else'.

Decatur, GA

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²³ For this sense cf. J. D. Denniston, *Greek Particles*² (Oxford, 1954), p. 196.

²⁴ Cf. Cook Wilson (n. 12), 109 and Cherniss 53, 54 = 368, 369.

²⁵ Denniston (n. 23), 195; cf. the similar use of καί (ibid. 295–6).

²⁶ On the sense of φάντασμα here cf. Cherniss 59 n. 7 = 374 n. 7.

A NEW PYTHAGOREAN FRAGMENT AND HOMER'S TEARS IN ENNIUS

Schol. Hom. *Π* 857 a, IV pp. 310–11 Erbse a.¹ Πυθαγόρας φησὶν ὡς ἀναχωροῦσα ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκείνῳ γίνεται, {ἐν} ᾧ ἂν γεννομένῳ σώματι ἡ φυτῷ καταντήσῃ. λυπείται οὖν ὡς ἀκμάζον ἕως αὐτῷ σώματι καὶ δεδοικυῖα, μὴ ποτε ἀναξίῳ περιπέσῃ. πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὖν συγκαλεῖ λέγων ὡς τὰ γενναῖα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ψυχῇ <καταλείπουσα θρηνεῖ>. T; a.² λυπείται ἡ ψυχὴ, μὴ ποτε ἀνάξια πράξασα ἑαυτῇ ἀναξίως περιπέσῃ καὶ ὅτι σώμα ἔα ἀκμάζον. ὁ δὲ Πυθαγόρας κακῶς φησι ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τὸ ἐξελεῖν εἰς φυτὰ τινα καὶ σώματα καὶ θάμνους